Mapping the OWASP Non-Human Identities Top 10 to controls you can evidence
A practical walk through the ten NHI risk categories, the question each one asks, and the evidence a control plane should be able to show for it.
Read moreCredential Security
Trustivan maps every discovered credential to the identity that presents it and the owner accountable for it, and raises age, rotation, expiry and exposure findings with the evidence attached — reading metadata only, never the secret.
AvailableCredential Security · M3
Available · credential metadata from AWS, Kubernetes and Vault · exposures through the ingestion API
AWS_KEY=AKIA…4Q2Fexposed · 611dSample environment
The problem
A credential is a copy of authority — and every copy that outlives its purpose is an access path nobody is watching.
Access keys, tokens and certificates are created without expiry, and the longer they live the less anyone remembers what still depends on them
One key ends up in three pipelines, a laptop and a wiki page, so rotating it breaks something nobody can name
A scanner finds the string in a repository, but not the identity that presents it, the human who owns it or what it can reach
The fix is not a better regular expression. It is knowing, for every credential, which identity presents it, who owns that identity and what it can reach — so rotation and expiry can be driven from a finding instead of a hunch.
How it works
Capabilities available today, each anchored to the identity that holds the credential rather than to the string itself.
M3 · AvailableConnectors read credential metadata where identities live — AWS access keys, Kubernetes service-account tokens and Vault AppRoles — and never the secret itself. Trustivan ships no scanner: exposures your scanners find arrive through an authenticated ingestion API and are matched to a credential where one exists.
Credential findings by kind
Last 30 days · sample environment
Illustrative data · exposures are reported through the ingestion API
A credential on its own is a string. Mapped to its identity it becomes a path: who presents it, who owns that identity, what it authenticates to and what it can reach. That mapping is what turns a scanner hit into a decision someone can act on.
Age, exposure and expiry are the signals that most reliably precede a credential incident. Trustivan evaluates them per credential, raises findings with the evidence attached, and weights risk by the privilege of the identity that holds them.
AKIA…4Q2Faccess keysvc-deploy611 d×0Rotation overdueAKIA…7ML0access keyrelease-user402 d×0Rotation overduearc_…e21runtime credentialrelease-agentexpires 9 d×0ExpiringAKIA…Q9C1access keybilling-sync38 d×2Exposedsecret-idVault AppRoleetl-approle2 d×0ActiveSecret scanners are a valuable source, and Trustivan takes their findings through its ingestion API. But a match is not a finding until it knows its identity, owner and reach — and a finding records who triaged it and why.
Whose credential is this, what can its identity reach, and who owns the fix?
Read: Identity ≠ CredentialScannerA string that matches a credential pattern
TrustivanThe identity that presents it, and the team or person who owns that identity
ScannerThe file and commit where it was found
TrustivanWhere its identity authenticates and what it can reach
ScannerA count of findings, ranked by pattern confidence
TrustivanPriority by blast radius: privilege, exposure, reachability and lifecycle, with evidence
ScannerDelete the line and close the alert
TrustivanPropose rotation or revocation for a second person’s approval — and keep the decision on record
Scanners stay useful as a source. The graph turns their output into findings that know their identity, owner and blast radius.
Remediation starts from the finding: propose a rotation or revocation, have a second person approve it, and record the outcome. Trustivan never rotates, vaults or revokes a credential at a provider — a person makes that change, and the platform keeps the decision.
Remediation
Propose rotating AKIA…4Q2F for svc-deploy from its rotation-overdue finding.
proposal · finding reference
A second person approves; nobody approves their own request.
approval record · actor · time
No executor exists for AWS, so the platform says so instead of pretending the key was rotated.
no_executor_for_provider
A person rotates the key in AWS; the next sync records the new key and the finding resolves.
next sync · credential age
Scope
The M3 milestone of the platform trajectory, published so you can plan against it — and so nobody mistakes a direction for a shipped feature.
Credential blast radius is part of this milestone. The platform never vaults, rotates or revokes customer credentials. See the full platform trajectory
Inventory access keys, Kubernetes service-account tokens and Vault AppRoles as metadata — secret values are never read
Link every credential to the identity that presents it, the owner accountable for it and the services it unlocks
Take exposures your scanners report through the ingestion API, match each to a credential and identity, and flag credentials shared between agents
Flag rotation-overdue and expiring credentials, and propose a rotation a second person must approve
Resolve what a compromised credential reaches — repositories, workloads, accounts, servers — through the identity that holds it
Read AppRoles, entities, auth mounts and the policy names they hold from HashiCorp Vault — never secret data, leases or tokens
Cross-pillar
A credential finding knows its identity and owner because Identity Governance exists — and knows when an agent holds it because Agent Authorization does.
Explore the platformDiscover, classify and own non-human identities — service accounts, roles, workloads, bots, apps and automation.
Discover IAM roles and machine users, GitHub Apps and bots, Kubernetes service accounts and Vault AppRoles across your connected estate
Attach every identity to an accountable owner and a lifecycle state — and flag the orphans that nobody claims
Govern AI agents, their tools, credentials and permissions — and authorize every action they take at a deny-by-default gate.
Give each agent an owner, a declared autonomy and a scoped set of tool entitlements, over MCP tools the platform discovers
Evaluate credential state, tool entitlement, effect, resource impact, autonomy and standing grants before an action runs — ALLOW, CHALLENGE or DENY
Ask how credential findings fit your clouds, clusters and Vault — and see them on the identity graph, available today.
Resources
Guides and research on credential risk, the OWASP Non-Human Identities Top 10 and the relationship model behind the platform.
Browse all resourcesA practical walk through the ten NHI risk categories, the question each one asks, and the evidence a control plane should be able to show for it.
Read moreHow Trustivan types each identity, records who owns it and on whose word, and tracks where it is in its life — with evidence behind every value and unknown shown as unknown.
Read moreHow identities enter Trustivan — one read-only connector contract with a sync lifecycle and evidence on every record — and a graph you can walk for reach, paths and blast radius.
Read more